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Summary 
Content, according to Bolzano, is intransparent: our knowledge of certain essential features of the 
contents of our contentful mental acts (such as their identity and composition) is often severely 
limited. In this paper, I identify various intransparency theses Bolzano is committed to and present 
and evaluate the defence he offers for his view. I argue that while his intransparency theses may be 
correct, his defence is unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that improving on his defence would require 
substantially modifying his general epistemology of content. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most well-researched components of Bernard Bolzano’s philosophy is his theory of the 
contents of our contentful mental acts and states, i.e. his theory of propositions (Sätze an sich) and 
objective Ideas (Vorstellungen an sich). This paper is concerned with an aspect of Bolzano’s theory 
of content which, as far as I am aware, has received comparatively little attention in the existing 
literature: the thesis that content is intransparent in the sense that our knowledge of the contents of 
our mental acts and states is often severely limited. While it is well-known that Bolzano held this 
view, I know of no detailed examination of the defence he offers for it. I shall here attempt to close 
this gap in the literature. The main source for my discussion is Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre 
(henceforth: WL), and in particular WL III, §350 which contains Bolzano’s most explicit discussion 
of his intransparency thesis.2 
 The structure of the paper is as follows: After briefly explaining the key concepts of 
Bolzano’s theory of content in §2, I distinguish a number of intransparency theses that Bolzano is 
1 Numerous people provided helpful feedback on the material on which this paper is based. I would like to thank in 
particular Peter Simons, Mark Textor, Benjamin Schnieder, Moritz Schulz, and Mirja Holst. Thanks are also due to 
the audience at the conference on Truth and Abstract Objects: Issues from Bolzano and Frege, where I presented an 
earlier version of the paper. 
2 A note on citation. Titles of Bolzano’s works are abbreviated; a key is provided in the bibliography. References to 
WL are made by volume, paragraph and (where applicable) page number. 
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explicitly or implicitly committed to (§3). §4 analyses Bolzano’s attempt to provide a defence for 
one of his intransparency theses and shows how, and under what assumptions, it can be extended to 
the others as well. In §5 I evaluate the defence of intransparency and argue that it fails. §6 briefly 
summarizes the paper’s main conclusions. 
 
2. Preliminaries 
The core elements of Bolzano’s theory of content are his concept of a proposition and his concept 
of an objective Idea. Before I explain these concepts, a brief remark on terminology: Bolzano often 
uses ‘Vorstellung’ (idea) without qualification and leaves it to context to disambiguate between the 
objective and the subjective variety. I will use ‘Idea’ (capital ‘I’) for objective Ideas, and ‘idea’ for 
subjective ones. In quotations, unqualified occurrences of ‘Vorstellung’ are translated by ‘idea’. 
 A proposition is the kind of thing that is grasped in an act of thinking, that is judged to be 
true in a judgement, or presented as true in an assertion, where it is to be understood that a 
proposition need not be considered in thought or expressed in speech in order for it to exist (cf. WL 
I, §19, pp. 76ff). So if someone judges that p, the content of his judgement is the proposition that p.3 
(In what follows, I shall often abbreviate ‘the proposition that p’ by ‘[p]’.) Note that these remarks 
are intended by Bolzano merely as an informal elucidation of the concept of a proposition, not as a 
reductive analysis; Bolzano explicitly says that he does not know how to give such an analysis (cf. 
WL I, §23, p. 91). 
 Every proposition is either true or false, but not both, and it is true or false simpliciter. In 
contrast to utterances or acts of thinking, which are also true or false simpliciter, propositions are 
non-actual, i.e. they are incapable of acting upon something. Bolzano contends that by drawing on 
these characteristics, we can fix the extension, though not the content, of ‘proposition’: something is 
a proposition iff it is non-actual and true or false simpliciter (cf. B/Exner, pp. 62f).4 
3 Bolzano calls what is judged in a judgement the matter (Stoff) of the judgement; I will use the more common term 
‘content’ instead. 
4 On proposition’s being true or false simpliciter, see also WL II, §125; on actuality, see AA, p. 85; on proposition’s 
being non-actual, see WL I, §19, p. 78; WL II, §122. – The bi-conditional invites questions: Could there not be, in 
addition to Bolzano’s propositions, which are individuated very finely, truth-bearers which are more coarsely 
individuated, such as intensions? If so, the bi-conditional might be false, since intensions are also non-actual. 
Bolzano might reply that intensions couldn’t be true or false in the same sense that his propositions are, so the bi-
conditional comes out true on the intended reading of ‘true’ and ‘false’. (In the paragraph of the WL which is 
concerned with the notion of truth, Bolzano does distinguish numerous senses of the terms ‘true’ or ‘false’, differing 
in part in what kind of thing they apply to (cf. WL I, §24).) However, if this reply is adequate, then the non-actuality 
condition appears redundant, since the sense in which judgements or utterances are true or false presumably also 
differs from the sense in which propositions are. (Note that Bolzano usually calls judgements correct or incorrect 
rather than ‘true’ or ‘false’, where a judgement’s correctness (incorrectness) is defined as the truth (falsity) of its 
content (cf. WL I, §34). – Thanks to Moritz Schulz and Mark Textor  for pressing me on these points. 
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 Bolzano thinks that both propositions and the mental acts they are the contents of have 
mereological structure. Every part of a proposition which is not itself a proposition is an objective 
Idea. Analogously, every part of a propositional act (such as an act of judging) which is not itself a 
propositional act is a subjective idea.5 According to Bolzano, we can turn these observations into 
analyses of the concepts objective Idea and subjective idea:6 
(Objective Idea – OI) 
x is an objective Idea ↔ x is not a proposition & ∃y (y is a proposition & x < y). 
(Subjective Idea – SI) 
x is a subjective idea ↔ x is not a propositional act & ◊∃y (y is a propositional act & x < y). 
Some, but not all, Ideas are themselves composite; their parts are either Ideas or propositions. 
Likewise, some, but not all, ideas are composite; their parts are either ideas or propositional acts. 
The relation between Ideas and ideas corresponds to that between propositions and judgements: 
every idea has an Idea as its content (cf. WL I, §§56, 58, 61; WL III, §§271, 277). 
 Given that propositional acts, ideas, and their contents are structured, how are they 
structured? Firstly, the structures of propositions and Ideas correspond, though only roughly, to the 
structures of their linguistic expressions. Only roughly, because some simple expressions have 
composite contents, because some natural language sentences are syntactically ambiguous, and 
because not all structural differences between sentences affect the content of the sentences.7 
Restricting attention to structurally perspicuous expressions, we can say that if c is the content of 
5 According to Bolzano, judgings are the only acts of thinking which have propositions as their complete contents; an 
act of merely considering whether p is about the proposition that p, which is represented (denoted) by the complete 
content of the act of thinking. Künne argues convincingly that we do u Bolzano a favour if we modify his account so 
as to allow that mere entertainings of a thought have propositions as complete contents (cf. Künne 1997, p. 218ff). I 
shall here adopt this modification and use ‘propositional act’ for both kinds of acts of thinking. 
6 ‘<’ means is a proper part of. – Naturally, in the case of subjective ideas, Bolzano’s explanation appeals only to 
judgements (cf. WL III, §270). On objective Ideas, cp. WL I, §48, p. 216; WL II, §128; B/Exner, p. 67. Note that in 
WL I, §52, p. 228 Bolzano denies that (a variant of) (OI) is to be seen as a conceptual analysis; I am following 
Künne in taking the opinion expressed in the passages mentioned before to be his considered view (cf. Künne 1997, 
p. 211). Finally, in WL I, §48, p. 216; §49, p. 221 Bolzano explains an objective Idea as something which can be part 
of a proposition. The possibility operator is redundant unless there are objective Ideas which are not (but could have 
been) parts of propositions which seems implausible. The fact that in WL I, §52, p. 228, Bolzano himself endorses 
the non-modal version of the claim indicates that he also thinks that the possibility operator is redundant. 
7 Bolzano takes it to be obvious that the structure of expressions is a guide to the structure of their contents, he does 
not argue for the claim (cf. e.g. WL I, §50, p. 222, §56, p. 244; WL II, §123). As for syntactical ambiguity, see 
Bolzano’s remarks in WL I, §59 on ‘a painted fish’, which may mean a fish, of which there is a painting but is 
usually used to mean painting of a fish, and on the ambiguity of phrases of the form ‘this A’. As for insignificant 
structural differences: Bolzano thinks that in Ideas of the form [something which has a, b, c] (I here extend the 
bracket-notation in the obvious way), the property-Ideas [a], [b] and [c] are not ordered, so ‘something which has a, 
b, c’ expresses the same Idea as ‘something which has b, c, a’ (cf. WL I, §58, pp. 256f). See also Textor 1997, pp. 
190f. 
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expression e, then every significant fragment of e expresses a part of c, and the significant parts of e 
are arranged in the same way as their respective contents are arranged in c. Secondly, there is an 
exact correspondence between the structures of acts of thinking and their contents: if c is the content 
of an act of thinking t, then every part of c is the content of a part of t, every part of t has a part of c 
as content, and the parts of t are arranged in the same way as the corresponding parts of c (cf. WL 
III, §281, p. 39; §291, p. 109). 
 It is clear that in addition to having contents, many propositional acts and subjective ideas 
also stand in some special relation to an expression of their respective content. When we think in 
words, or read a sentence with understanding, we grasp the relevant propositions, in some sense, by 
means of linguistic vehicles that express them (or maybe which we take to express them). 
Correspondingly, some of the subjective ideas that make up a propositional act are likewise 
associated with an expression that occurs in the expression corresponding to the propositional act 
and that expresses (or is taken to express) the content of the idea. I shall call the expression (if any) 
thus associated with a given contentful mental act or state its guise. Although Bolzano does not 
have an official term equivalent to my ‘guise’, there is a way of interpreting the term within 
Bolzano’s framework. In WL III, §§283-4, Bolzano discusses the phenomenon that an idea may 
renew, create, or, as I shall say, trigger another idea. When one has frequently had an idea with 
content c and an idea with content d at (roughly) the same time, one may come to associate ideas of 
these kinds so that often when one has an idea with content c, one will also form an idea with 
content d, which is triggered by the former. For example, if a certain song keeps reminding you of a 
particular event at which it was played, your hearing the song may trigger an idea of that event. 
Now on seeing an expression which one understands, say ‘snow’, one will usually form an idea of 
snow, and when one thinks of snow, one will often form an idea of ‘snow’ (or of another term 
expressing [snow]). Bolzano conceives of these cases of reading with understanding and thinking in 
words as instances of the phenomenon just described: for thinkers who are familiar with the word 
‘snow’, ideas of snow and ideas of ‘snow’ tend to trigger each other (cf. WL III, §285). It does not 
appear very plausible to claim that the fact that an idea or propositional act has triggered, or was 
triggered by, an idea of an expression of its content guarantees that the expression in question is the 
guise of the idea. Perhaps, if one is attempting to translate ‘snow is white’ into German, one’s idea 
of snow that is guised by ‘snow’ could also trigger an idea of ‘Schnee’.8 Fortunately, as far as I can 
tell, Bolzano is not committed to this stronger and implausible thesis. Thus, we should ascribe to 
him only the weaker (if less specific) claim that the relationship between a guised idea or 
8 Thanks here to Moritz Schulz. 
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propositional act x and its guise consists in x’s having triggered or having been triggered by an idea 
of an expression of its content  in the right kind of way (whatever it is). 
 
3. The Intransparency Theses 
Discussions, and endorsements, of claims to the effect that our knowledge of the contents of our 
mental states is often very limited can be found in many passages throughout the WL (cf. e.g. I, §64; 
III, §§280f, 350ff; IV, §§554ff). These claims play a particularly important role in Bolzano’s theory 
of Explanations of Ideas. The demand for an Explanation of an Idea, in Bolzano’s use of the term, 
is 
[…] the demand that we specify in a way conforming to the truth whether a certain idea 
which we presently find in our consciousness is atomic or complex, and in the latter case, 
out of which further ideas and in what combination of them it is composed. (WL III, §350, p. 
397.)9 
In discussion of Explanations, Bolzano sometimes oscillates between talk of Ideas and talk of ideas. 
His notion of Explanations officially applies to both. Given the structural correspondence between 
ideas and their contents, one presumably straightforwardly obtains an Explanation of an idea from 
an Explanation of its content, et vice versa. As will become evident later on, Bolzano regards 
knowledge of the composition of an idea as prior to knowledge of the composition of its content; 
that is, one explains an Idea by explaining an act of grasping it. 
 Bolzano’s notion of an Explanation clearly is a close relative to what is nowadays usually 
called ‘conceptual analysis’. The latter notion is notoriously troubled by the threat of paradox: it 
appears that if an analysis is to be correct, analysans and analysandum have to be synonymous, but 
that if they are, the analysis would have to be trivial.10 A version of this puzzle appears in Bolzano’s 
discussion of the epistemology of Explanations. Bolzano concedes that it may appear very easy to 
figure out the composition of an Idea one grasps, but insists that experience proves this appearance 
to be deceptive: 
9 Translations from Bolzano’s works are my responsibility. I have usually consulted, but not always stuck to, the 
translations in ToS or those of other commentators, and am therefore to be blamed for mistakes but not to be praised 
for accuracy. In key quotations, I reproduce the German original in footnotes. – ‘[. . . ] die Forderung, daß wir auf 
eine der Wahrheit gemäße Art bestimmen, a ob eine gewisse Vorstellung, die wir so eben in unserem Bewußtsein 
vorfinden, einfach oder zusammengesetzt, und in dem letzteren Falle, aus welchen andern Vorstellungen und in 
welcher Verbindung sie aus denselben zusammengesetzt sey.’ 
10 Langford 1942 is the classical source for (this version of) the paradox of analysis. Langford’s paper is explicitly 
concerned with Moore’s notion of analysis, Moore replies in Moore 1942, pp. 660–7. See also Black 1944; 1945; 
1946; White 1945a; 1945b; Church 1946; Carnap 1947, §15. 
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At first glance, one is inclined to think that a question of this kind is very easy to answer; 
since it seems that everybody must know whether an idea which he possesses is atomic or 
composed out of parts and [if complex] out of which parts and in what combination of them 
it is put together. But experience teaches us that just this is one of the most difficult tasks. 
(ibid.)11 
Bolzano is therefore committed to the claim that specifying the composition of an idea one 
presently has is often very difficult. And the context in which he endorses this claim also makes it 
clear why it is important to him: it forms the basis of his answer to the paradox of analysis. 
 A bit of conceptual machinery will be useful for finding a more precise reformulation of this 
intransparency claim as well as the ones we will discuss later on. I shall try to capture the 
intransparency theses in terms of what a thinker is or is not guaranteed to be in a position to know 
concerning the contents of his present mental acts or states. Roughly, a thinker is said to be in a 
position to know something iff were he to consider it, he would know it or come to know it. This is 
somewhat vague, but for our purposes it is good enough. The knowledge with which the various 
intransparency theses are concerned is supposed by Bolzano to often be very difficult to acquire. If 
it is very difficult to come to know something, then one is not, in the relevant sense, in a position to 
know it.12 
 The kind of knowledge the above intransparency claim is concerned with is knowledge of 
the composition of an idea one presently has (or equivalently, its content). I therefore propose to 
reformulate the claim thus: 
(I-ComS – Intransparency of Composition, Specification) 
It is not the case that necessarily, if one has an idea x, then one is in a position to know the 
composition of x. 
Note that in order to be interesting, this claim has to be construed as restricted to ‘cognitively well-
functioning’ individuals, i.e. individuals capable of a normal degree of rational reflection in a 
standard epistemic situation. (This point applies to all the intransparency claims I discuss in what 
follows.) Even when so construed, (I-ComS) is a fairly weak intransparency thesis. Notably, it is 
11 ‘Auf den ersten Blick möchte man zwar glauben, daß eine Frage der Art sehr leicht zu beantworten wäre; indem es 
doch Jeder, wie es scheint, selbst wissen muß, ob eine Vorstellung, die er besitzt, einfach oder aus Theilen und aus 
welchen Theilen und in welcher Verbindung derselben sie zusammengesetzt sey. Die Erfahrung aber lehrt, daß 
gerade diese Aufgabe eine der schwierigsten sey.’ 
12 On the notion of being in a position to know, see also Williamson 2000, p. 95, from where I have borrowed the 
terminology. 
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consistent with the claim that as soon as one is confronted with a correct specification of the 
composition of an idea one presently has, one must be in a position to recognize it as correct. That 
Bolzano also rejects this latter claim is clear from his discussion of the identity conditions of 
objective Ideas in WL I, §64, pp. 269ff. Bolzano here considers the thought that an Idea x is 
identical with an Idea y if necessarily, all and only those objects stand under x as stand under y. He 
points out that this thesis commits one to numerous counter-intuitive claims concerning the 
composition of our ideas. For example, since necessarily, all and only equilateral triangles are 
equiangular, the thesis implies that [equilateral triangle] is identical to [equiangular triangle] and 
thus that [equiangular], which is a part of [equiangular triangle], is also a part of [equilateral 
triangle], which is counter-intuitive. Crucially, although Bolzano takes the proposed identity 
criterion to be inadequate, he does not take this particular argument to decisively refute it, on the 
grounds that we might simply be unaware of the alleged part of our idea (cf. WL I, §64, pp. 272f). 
Bolzano thus allows for the possibility that one may take a correct (partial) specification of the 
composition of an idea one currently has to be incorrect: 
(I-ComR – Intransparency of Composition, Recognition) 
It is not the case that necessarily, if one has an idea x, and is presented with a correct 
specification S of x’s composition, one is in a position to know that S is correct. 
Note also that Bolzano has to allow for this possibility in order for his response to the paradox of 
analysis to be satisfactory, since it seems that even a correct conceptual analysis need not be 
instantly recognizable as correct. At any rate, many of the Explanations Bolzano himself puts forth, 
such as the Explanation of [Idea] as [non-propositional part of a proposition], are certainly not 
immediately obvious. 
 A slight modification of the above example also makes clear that one may have two ideas 
with the same content without being in a position to know that they have the same content. If this 
was not the case the identity thesis could be refuted by pointing out that it implies the claim that 
[equilateral triangle] is identical with [equiangular triangle], although it certainly does not seem as 
though ideas which have these Ideas as contents are content-identical. Bolzano is therefore also 
committed to the following intransparency thesis: 
(I-ConI – Intransparency of Content-Identity) 
It is not the case that necessarily, if one has an idea x and an idea y, and x has the same 
content as y, one is in a position to know that x has the same content as y. 
7 
In addition to these claims, there is a further, stronger intransparency thesis which I think Bolzano 
has to accept, even though his commitment to it is less direct and explicit than in the previous cases. 
Consider again the case of [equilateral triangle] and [equiangular triangle]. Not only may one 
(rightly) doubt that these are one and the same Idea, one may also fail to be in a position to know 
that they have same extension; more precisely, one may fail to be in a position to know the 
proposition expressed by ‘All and only equiangular triangles are equilateral triangles’ under the 
guise of that sentence.13 It is clear from Bolzano’s discussion in the mentioned passage that he does 
not regard even this as establishing the distinctness of the Ideas in question. But of course, even one 
who is not in a position to have this knowledge may at the same time be in a position to know the 
proposition expressed by ‘All and only equiangular triangles are equiangular triangles’ under the 
guise of that sentence. Bolzano is therefore also committed to the following intransparency claim: 
(I-Eqv – Intransparency of Equivalence) 
It is not the case that necessarily, if one attaches the same proposition x to sentences S and T, 
then if one is in a position to know x under the guise of S, one is in a position to know x 
under the guise of T. 
Note that again, the paradox of analysis would appear to force Bolzano to accept this claim: it is 
plausible that misleading evidence may prevent one from being in a position to know even the 
extensional adequacy of a correct analysis. (Some have argued that there are actual counter-
examples to the claim that knowledge requires belief, but no one has ever taken the mere fact that 
some philosophers believe there to be such counter-examples to establish, by itself, the falsity of 
analyses of knowledge which entail that knowledge requires belief.) 
 
4. The Defence of Intransparency 
We have seen that while Bolzano concedes that it is prima facie very plausible to think that the 
composition of one’s present ideas is the kind of thing one must be in a position to know, he thinks 
that experience shows otherwise. By itself, this does not constitute a satisfactory defence of 
intransparency. Firstly, even if Bolzano is right about what experience shows, it is still puzzling 
why it is hard to know the composition of one’s ideas. His view would thus be significantly 
strengthened by an account of why our pertinent intuitions are misleading. Secondly, I don’t think it 
is obvious that Bolzano is right about what experience shows. It is clear, perhaps, that we know 
13 Here and in what follows, ‘knowing a proposition x’ is to be understood not in the sense of acquaintance with a 
proposition, but as equivalent to knowing that p, where the proposition that p = x. 
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from experience that conceptual analysis is hard; this is part of what makes the paradox of analysis 
a paradox. But from this it only follows that knowing the composition of one’s ideas is hard given 
that Bolzano’s account of conceptual analysis is correct. That Bolzano’s account is correct, 
however, cannot simply be taken for granted. It is certainly conceivable that what we do when we 
try to analyse certain concepts is not accurately described as an attempt to specify the composition 
of our acts of grasping these concepts. A satisfactory defence of intransparency must therefore tell 
us both why the transparency claims appear so plausible, and why this appearance is deceptive. 
 Bolzano comes closest to providing an explicit answer to these questions in the following 
passage: 
Because most of our ideas do not achieve clarity, or, what means just the same, are not 
intuited by us; so the same often holds for those part-ideas (Theilvorstellungen) out of which 
some other [idea] is composed, even in the case where we intuit the latter, insofar as it is a 
whole. But if we do not intuit each of the parts of an idea individually, then it is no wonder 
that we also cannot make the judgement that those ideas occur as parts in [the complex idea]. 
(WL III, §350, pp. 397f.)14 
The phrase ‘one cannot make the judgement that p’ is here most naturally understood in such a way 
that one’s being able to make the judgement that p implies that one is in a position to make the 
judgement and thereby come to know that p. Bolzano’s suggestion then seems to be that as soon as 
one appreciates that in most cases, the parts of our complex ideas are not clear, one should no 
longer find it surprising that one is often not in a position to know how one’s ideas are composed.15 
We can capture his proposal by the following theses: 
(T1) Most of one’s ideas are not clear. 
(T2) One can make the judgement that a complex idea one presently has is composed in 
 such and such a way only if its parts are clear. 
(T3) (T1) and (T2) jointly make it unsurprising that one is often not in a position to know 
 the composition of one’s ideas. 
14 ‘Denn weil die meisten unserer Vorstellungen sich nicht zur Klarheit erheben, oder was eben so viel heißt, nicht von 
uns angeschaut werden: so geschieht dieß auch häufig mit jenen Theilvorstellungen, aus welchen irgend eine andere 
zusammengesetzt ist, selbst in dem Falle, wenn wir die letztere, sofern sie ein Ganzes ist, anschauen. Schauen wir 
aber die Theile, aus denen eine Vorstellung bestehet, nicht einzeln an: so ist es begreiflich, daß wir auch nicht das 
Urtheil, diese Vorstellungen seien in jener als Theile vorhanden, aussprechen können.’ 
15 If (and when) a thinker knows how and of what parts an idea he presently has is composed, Bolzano calls the idea in 
question ‘distinct’ (cf. WL III, §281, pp. 40f). 
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If true, (T1)–(T3) would constitute an adequate defence of the first of Bolzano’s intransparency 
claims, (I-ComS). In §4.1, I examine the notion of clarity Bolzano’s account invokes; §4.2 uses the 
results of this discussion to further spell out (T1)–(T3) and then shows how the proposal might 
generalise to the other intransparency claims as well.16 
 
4.1 The Explication of Clarity 
A subjective idea is clear (klar), according to Bolzano, iff its bearer has an intuition of it (cf. WL III, 
§280, p. 29):17,18 
(Clear) 
If a person x has a subjective idea y then y is clear (at t) iff x has an intuition of y (at t).19 
A (subjective) intuition is a subjective idea which has an (objective) Intuition as content; an 
Intuition is an Idea which is both singular, i.e. exactly one object stands under it, and atomic.20 
Paradigmatic examples of Intuitions are the Ideas expressed by the demonstrative ‘this’ in a context 
of utterance; Intuitions of one’s subjective ideas can also be expressed by ‘this’ (cf. WL I, §72, pp. 
326f; III, §280, pp. 38f).21 
 (Clear) is not meant to be a mere stipulation, nor is it intended to capture precisely an 
ordinary use of ‘clear’, as applied to ideas. Bolzano suggests that in every-day life, ‘clear idea’ is 
used to express a variety of different concepts, and seeks a definition of the kind Carnap would later 
call ‘explication’, i.e. he tries to define the term in such a way as is most useful for scientic purposes 
(cf. WL III, §280, p. 25).22 Bolzano approximates the intended sense of ‘clear’ by saying that an 
idea is to be called ‘clear’ iff its bearer is aware of it. The awareness in question, he argues, ought 
16 For more recent defences of the intransparency of content – often focussing on principles akin to (I-Eqv) – see e.g. 
Burge 1978, Burge 1986, and Williamson 2006. 
17 ‘Intuition’ is a technical term of Bolzano’s. I trust that in what follows, context makes it clear whether the Bolzanian 
use of ‘intuition’ is intended, or the more common one that is in play when I speak of, for example, our intuitions 
contradicting the intransparency theses. 
18 For a very thorough discussion of Bolzano’s notion of clarity, as well as his related notion of an idea’s distinctness, 
which goes into much more detail than I do here, see Centrone forthcoming.  
19 The relativization to a time is not explicit in Bolzano. It is strictly speaking required, though, as Centrone points out, 
since no idea is ‘born’ clear, but becomes clear if and when its bearer forms an intuition of it (cf. Centrone 
forthcoming, §2). 
20 In Bolzano’s terminology, objects stand, rather than fall, under Ideas representing them. 
21 For more on ‘this’, see WL I, §§59, 68 and the detailed discussion of Bolzano’s notion of Intuitions in Textor 1996, 
ch. 2. 
22 In a long first note to §280, Bolzano also discusses in detail how his explication of ‘clear’ relates to those of 
previous authors, stressing in particular its similarities to Descartes’ acceptation of the term as well as its strong 
dissimilarities to Leibniz’s. For a detailed examination of Bolzano’s and Leibniz’s notions of clarity, see Centrone 
(forthcoming). 
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not to be construed as requiring that the thinker judges that she has this idea, since whether or not 
such a judgement is made depends in part on accidental aspects of the situation. It ought to be both 
necessary and sufficient for a thinker’s being aware of an idea, Bolzano suggests, that she would 
make such a judgement if she had any cause to do so (cf. WL III, §280, p. 27). In my terminology, 
this means that a thinker’s idea is to be called ‘clear’ iff she is in a position to judge that she has it. 
 Bolzano’s argument that (Clear) underwrites this bi-conditional is as follows:23 Any 
judgement to the effect that I have a certain idea x must have a component under which x and only x 
stands. So, Bolzano contends, I am, in the relevant sense, in a position to judge that I have x only if 
I have a singular idea of x. But not any idea which represents x exclusively makes one aware of x. 
Suppose that of all my present ideas, x is the one whose content I have grasped most often. It is 
plausible that merely forming an idea with the content [the present idea of mine whose content I 
have grasped most often] does not make me aware of x; as Bolzano points out, I may form such an 
idea without so much as knowing the idea it represents (ohne [die Vorstellung] zu kennen; WL III, 
§285, p. 28f). What makes the idea unfit to ‘clarify’ x, Bolzano claims, is that it is in virtue of the 
idea’s specific composition that it represents x and only x. This leads him to demand of clarifiers not 
just that they are singular, but also that they are atomic, i.e. intuitions (cf. ibid). 
 It is not clear that the restriction of the title ‘clarifier’ to atomic ideas of ideas is well-
motivated. If the awareness of an idea Bolzano wants to capture is supposed to be a kind of direct 
awareness, then it does seem plausible that only atomic ideas can serve as clarifiers. But if Bolzano 
merely wants to rule out ideas of ideas which one can have without knowing the idea they represent, 
then the exclusion of all complex ideas may be unwarranted. For if knowing the represented idea is 
knowing which idea is represented, and if one knows that if one knows that the represented idea is, 
say, my present idea of a pen, then ideas whose content can be expressed by ‘my present idea of F’ 
are also suitable as clarifiers.24 For the moment, we can set this issue aside, but we shall later 
encounter more reasons to think that ideas representing ideas in terms of their contents are perhaps 
23 Bolzano does not accept the bi-conditional as an Explanation of [clear] because such an Explanation would present 
as a part of [clear] the idea of a judgement to the effect that one has the respective idea. This is in tension, he claims, 
with the fact that such a judgement need not actually be made in order for an idea to be clear (cf. WL III, §280, p. 
27). 
24 On these issues, see also Dähnhardt 1992, pp. 61ff and Textor 1996, p. 114. – Note that one might even a wonder 
whether and how intuitions of ideas make one aware of their objects. Suppose I have an idea of a ball and I make a 
judgement to the effect that I have this idea, in which the idea is represented by an intuition. What is the content of 
such a judgement? Intuitions of ideas can be expressed by ‘this’, so the proposition in question can be expressed by 
‘I have this (idea)’ (cf. WL III, §280, pp. 38f). Intuitively, if I am to be said to be aware of my idea of a ball, I 
should also be able to say something more informative, for example: I have this/an idea of a ball. That is, I should be 
able to characterize the idea I am aware of in terms of its content. Intuitions thus can only be clarifiers if my 
intuiting the idea somehow guarantees that I know a way to express the content of the idea. How this might work is 
not obvious to me. 
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more pertinent to the relevant kind of reflection on one’s present thinking than Bolzanian intuitions. 
 
4.2 Explaining Away the Counter-Intuitions 
We can now return to Bolzano’s defence of intransparency. We saw that in order for his position to 
be satisfactory, it needs to explain why transparency, if it is false, nevertheless seems intuitively 
plausible. Bolzano’s answer, recall, consists of the following claims: 
(T1) Most of one’s ideas are not clear. 
(T2) One can make the judgement that a complex idea one presently has is composed in 
 such and such a way only if its parts are clear. 
(T3) (T1) and (T2) jointly make it unsurprising that one is often not in a position to know 
 the composition of one’s ideas. 
An idea’s being clear consists in its bearer having a kind of introspective awareness of the idea. 
(T1) then says that we often lack this kind of introspective awareness of our ideas, and (T2) says 
that this kind of introspective awareness is required if one is to be able to judge the composition of 
one’s ideas.25 According to (T3), (T1) and (T2) jointly make (I-ComS) unsurprising; that is, 
recognizing the truth of (T1) and (T2) undermines the intuitive support for the negation of (I-
ComS). Whether (T1)–(T3) are plausible will be discussed in the next section. In the remainder of 
this section, I want to ask whether if they are correct, the defence of (I-ComS) generalises to the 
other intransparency claims Bolzano is committed to. 
 The most obvious strategy for arguing that it does is to try and show that these 
intransparency claims follow from (I-ComS). So let us see how one could defend this idea. (I-
ComR) says that even when confronted with an adequate Explanation of an idea one presently has, 
one need not be in a position to recognize it as true. This follows from (I-ComS) just in case 
recognizing an Explanation as correct requires that one first comes to know how one’s idea is 
composed in order to then judge the proposed Explanation against this knowledge. This suggestion 
has at least some plausibility; the only way I see in which it could be false is if one could come to 
know that two of one’s ideas are content-identical without first ascertaining the composition of 
25 On a strong reading, (T2) has obvious counter-examples. Suppose I am aware of my present idea of an F and I know 
that every idea of an F is an idea of a G which is H. I can then infer how my idea of an F is composed independently 
of any kind of introspective awareness of its parts. On Bolzano’s view though, this way of coming to know how an 
idea of mine is composed is parasitic: it depends on knowledge which one standardly acquires by figuring out the 
composition of just such an idea. The objection therefore misfires if, as is plausible, Bolzano is talking about the 
canonical way of coming to know the composition of an idea. 
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each. If this is not a possibility, the defence of (I-ComS) will apparently generalise to (I-ComR), 
and equally to (I-ConI), which says that one is not always in a position to know that two of one’s 
ideas have the same content even if they are in fact content-identical.26 
 Finally, let us consider (I-Eqv), which says that one may fail to be in a position to know 
some proposition under the guise of some sentence even if one is in a position to know it under the 
guise of some other sentence. This claim does not follow in any straightforward way from any of 
the previous intransparency claims: coming to know a proposition which one already knows under 
some guise under an additional guise does not require prior knowledge that the guises (or one’s 
propositional acts guised by them) are content-identical. Nevertheless, it is not absurd to think that 
our intuitions against (I-Eqv) are based on the thought that one must be in a position to know the 
relevant content-identities: if one can fail to be in a position to recognize the content-identity, what 
intuitive reason is there to deny (I-Eqv)? If there is no such reason, the defence of (I-ComS) extends 
to (I-Eqv) as well. 
 
5. Objections 
Bolzano’s defence of intransparency rests on the claims 
(T1) Most of one’s ideas are not clear. 
(T2) One can make the judgement that a complex idea one presently has is composed in 
 such and such a way only if its parts are clear. 
(T3) (T1) and (T2) jointly make it unsurprising that one is often not in a position to know 
 the composition of one’s ideas. 
Given that the clarity of an idea requires the existence of a further idea exclusively representing the 
former, (T1) seems plausible to me. It certainly doesn’t seem as though we more or less constantly 
introspectively reflect on our present acts of thinking. Moreover, it is not clear that any significant 
26 There are some passages in WL which suggest that Bolzano does hold that knowledge of the composition of ideas is 
prior to knowlege of content-identity between ideas. For example, when discussing the thesis that necessarily co-
extensive ideas are identical, Bolzano considers whether ‘perhaps the difference we make between so-called 
equivalent ideas consists merely in the fact that in the one [idea] we think these, in the other we think those parts 
distinctly, while thinking the others only indistinctly’ (WL I, §64, p. 273, emphasis added). This remark suggests 
that the fallibility of our judgements concerning content-identity between ideas would be explained by differences 
with respect to which parts of an idea we tend to be aware of. This, however, would be implausible unless 
knowledge of content-identity between ideas is standardly based on knowledge of the ideas’ composition. 
Unfortunately though, in other places Bolzano presupposes the contrary view. In particular, Bolzano recommends, 
roughly, that one test a proposed Explanation of an idea by checking whether substituting the Explanans-expression 
for the Explanandum-expression in an arbitrary sentence results in an expression of a different content (cf. WL III, 
§350, p. 399). This advice would be singularly unhelpful if checking whether the propositional acts guised by the 
sentences have the same content required first ascertaining their respective composition. 
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benefit would be gained from doing so, so it would be a surprise if we found that we do constantly 
introspect our ideas. However, this is consistent with saying that in situations in which we have 
reason to attend to our present thinking, we invariably succeed in making our pertinent ideas clear – 
roughly speaking, that most of our ideas are not clear does not imply that they are hard to clarify.27 I 
think that this observation spells trouble for Bolzano’s defence of intransparency. 
 Recall that according to Bolzano, if an idea one presently has is not clear, then one is not in 
a position to judge – and thereby come to know – of the idea that one has it, because such a 
judgement would have to include a clarifier of the idea in question. We may grant that one cannot 
make a judgement of the pertinent sort without first clarifying the idea in question. Nevertheless, if 
clarifying the idea presents no obstacle – if one succeeds in clarifying one’s ideas whenever one has 
reason to – then one may be said to be in a position to judge (know) of the idea in question that one 
has it even if one has not (yet) clarified it. (I cannot leave my flat without first unlocking the door, 
but if unlocking the door presents no obstacle, I am in a position to leave my flat even when the 
door is locked.) A similar point then applies to (T2). According to (T2), one cannot make the 
judgement that a complex idea one presently has is composed in such and such a way unless one 
has clarified its parts. The reasoning, as before, is that such a judgement would have to include 
clarifiers of the parts of the complex idea (cf. WL III, §281, pp. 41f). But while it may be true that 
one cannot make a judgement of the pertinent sort until one has clarified the parts of the respective 
idea, one may nevertheless be in a position to make such a judgement even before that, provided 
that clarifying the parts, and recognizing that and how the complex idea is composed of them, 
presents no obstacle. (At least, this is so unless one construes the phrase ‘in a position to’ in such a 
demanding fashion that the claim that one isn’t always in a position to know the composition of 
one’s ideas looses interest.) 
 According to (T3), the claims (T1) and (T2) jointly undermine the intuitions against the 
view that one need not be in a position to know the composition of one’s ideas. The preceding 
considerations show that, on the reading of ‘in a position to know’ which is relevant in our context, 
(T1) and (T2) do not imply that one need not be in a position to know the composition of one’s 
ideas. While this does perhaps not entail that (T1) and (T2) do not undermine the transparency-
intuitions, I see no reason to think that they do. When presented with (T1) and (T2), someone who 
is attracted to the view that content is transparent can sensibly stick to her view and reply that she’s 
been given no reason to think that the composition of one’s ideas can be hard to figure out. I 
27 Of course, we cannot at any time clarify all  of our ideas, as this would require having an infinite number of ideas. 
(Bolzano uses this argument to show that at least some ideas are unclear; cf. WL III, §280, p. 30.) 
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conclude that in the absence of an argument to show that introspective awareness of our ideas is not 
just not automatic, but often hard to achieve, Bolzano’s defence of intransparency is unsuccessful.28 
 Moreover, I think the prospects for supplementing his defence by trying to provide such an 
argument are dim. Insofar as it is difficult to find out whether two ideas, or their guises, have the 
same content, or what the composition of some Idea is, the difficulty surely is not one of achieving 
introspective awareness of the relevant ideas and their parts. Rather, it seems to me, the difficulty is 
to come up with the relevant hypothetical scenarios against which to test the alleged identity of the 
content, or to recognize potential differences in their respective inferential connections, etc. 
 Closer attention to what is and what is not difficult in trying to determine the composition of 
certain Ideas reveals a further, more fundamental problem with Bolzano’s view. Any account of 
how we come to know the composition of Ideas, or acts of grasping them, must make the following 
datum intelligible: parts of a complex idea which correspond to a part of the guise of the idea are 
easier to recognize than parts of a complex idea whose guise has no significant parts. For example, 
if one grasps [Idea] under the guise of ‘Idea’, the part of one’s idea whose content is [proposition] 
must be harder to become aware of than when one grasps [Idea] under the guise of ‘non-
propositional part of a proposition’.29 Bolzano’s account makes this datum appear mysterious, for it 
is hard to see how an idea’s being guised could affect the difficulty or otherwise of forming an 
intuition of it. An intuition is an atomic idea which directly represents whatever object it is an idea 
of. The connection between an idea and its guise, according to Bolzano, consists in the idea’s 
triggering, or having been triggered by, an idea of the guise (in the right kind of way). It is unclear 
to me how a certain expression’s being associated in this way with a given idea could facilitate 
one’s forming a direct representation of this idea. One way of getting around this problem might be 
to say that clarifiers, rather than being intuitions, are ideas that represent the ideas they clarify in 
terms of their guise. Earlier I suggested that certain ideas whose content can be expressed by 
instances of ‘my present idea of F’ might play the role of clarifiers. Thus, one might think that an 
idea x clarifies an idea y iff: x represents y and only y, and x is guised by (a translation of) ‘my 
28 There is no doubt that Bolzano believes that it is often very hard to become aware of one’s ideas, and in particular to 
recognize the parts of a complex idea one presently has. For instance, he explicitly says that even when we have 
focussed our attention on a given idea we have, and made a determined attempt to discern parts in it, failure to 
recognize such parts ought to make us at best moderately confident that the idea in question is atomic (cf. WL III, 
§350, p. 398). 
29 When discussing the example of [equilateral triangle] and [equiangular triangle] I mentioned above, Bolzano 
suggests that the intuitive difference between necessarily equivalent ideas may consist merely in the fact that ‘in the 
one [idea] we think these, in the other we think those parts distinctly, while thinking the others only indistinctly’ 
(WL I, §64, p. 273). Presumably, what he means is that while in ideas guised by ‘equilateral triangle’, the part with 
content [equilateral], but not the (hypothesized) part with content [equiangular] tends to be clear, while in ideas 
guised by ‘equiangular triangle’, it tends to be the other way round. Why would that be, if not because of which 
parts correspond to parts of the respective guise? 
15 
                                                 
present idea of F’, where ‘F’ is the guise of y. However, on this view, guiseless parts of a complex 
idea cannot be clarified at all. Accordingly, it can no longer be maintained that coming to know the 
composition of an idea guised by a simple expression involves the clarification of its parts. Rather, 
one might suggest, knowledge of the composition of a complex idea standardly depends on prior 
knowledge of the content-identity of two of one’s ideas, one of which has a complex guise. Whether 
or not such a modification is promising, it substantially deviates from the view Bolzano presents, 
and it still faces the challenge of explaining away the intuitions to the effect that one must always be 
in a position to know whether two of one’s ideas have the same content. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In numerous places throughout his writings, Bolzano claims or implies that content is intransparent, 
i.e. that our knowledge of the contents of our own current mental acts or states is often severely 
limited. One of the main uses to which he puts this thesis is his attempt at a solution to the paradox 
of analysis – the puzzle of how a conceptual analysis can be both correct and informative. In this 
paper, I identified four different intransparency theses that Bolzano is explicitly or implicitly 
committed to and examined Bolzano’s defence of one of them – that one need not be in a position 
to know the composition of an idea one presently has (or that of its content) – as well as his notion 
of a clear idea on which it draws. I then presented what I take to be the most plausible assumptions 
on which the defence can be generalised to Bolzano’s other intransparency claims. Finally, I argued 
that as it stands, Bolzano’s defence of his intransparency theses is unsuccessful because it shows at 
best why we often lack knowledge of certain features of the contents of our mental acts and states, 
but not why such knowledge is often hard to acquire. Moreover, I suggested that Bolzano’s defence 
is hard to improve on without substantially modifying his overall epistemology of content as the 
latter appears ill-equipped to explain the relevance of the linguistic guises of our mental acts to the 
acquisition of knowledge of their – or their contents’ – composition. 
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